

On Hájek's Fuzzy Quantifiers

“Probably” and “Many”

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Łukasiewicz logic Ł

Connectives: implication \rightarrow and 'falsum' \perp (we set $\neg\varphi = \varphi \rightarrow \perp$)

(Standard) semantics: evaluation is a mapping $e: \text{FOR} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ st:

$$e(\perp) = 0 \qquad e(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = \min\{1, 1 - e(\varphi) + e(\psi)\}$$

Axiomatic system: deduction rule is *Modus Ponens* (from φ and $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ infer ψ); axioms are:

$$\begin{aligned} &\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \\ &(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi)) \\ &(\neg\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \\ &((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi) \end{aligned}$$

Completeness: $\text{Thm}(\text{Ł}) = \text{Taut}(\text{Ł})$

More on Łukasiewicz logic

Troubles with connectives

$$\varphi \wedge \psi \equiv_{\text{Bool}} \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \equiv_{\text{Bool}} \neg((\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \neg\psi)$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \neg(\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow \neg\frac{1}{2}) & & \neg((\frac{1}{2} \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}) \rightarrow \neg\frac{1}{2}) \\ \parallel & & \parallel \\ 0 & & \frac{1}{2} \end{array}$$

Thus we define:

$$\varphi \wedge \psi = \neg((\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \neg\psi) \quad e(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \min(e(\varphi), e(\psi))$$

$$\varphi \& \psi = \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \quad e(\varphi \& \psi) = \max(0, e(\varphi) + e(\psi) - 1)$$

Funny observation: $(\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi) \rightarrow \perp$ IS NOT provable in Ł
 $(\varphi \& \neg\varphi) \rightarrow \perp$ IS provable in Ł

Two useful connectives: $\varphi \oplus \psi = \neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ $\min(1, e(\varphi) + e(\psi))$
 $\varphi \ominus \psi = \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ $\max(0, e(\varphi) - e(\psi))$

On two conjunctions

& is not idempotent! Girard example:

A) If I have one dollar, I can buy a pack of Marlboros $D \rightarrow M$

B) If I have one dollar, I can buy a pack of Camels $D \rightarrow C$

Therefore: $D \rightarrow M \wedge C$ i.e.,

C) If I have one dollar, I can buy a pack of Ms and pack of Cs

BETTER: $D \& D \rightarrow M \& C$ i.e.,

C') If I have one dollar and I have one dollar,
I can buy a pack of Ms and pack of Cs

On two conjunctions (cont.)

Consider three glasses of beer: 0.3L, 0.5L, and 1L.

Consider predicates $P_a(x)$: 'Petr can drink x in a minutes'

	P_1	P_2	P_3
0.3L	1	1	1
0.5L	0	1	1
1L	0	0	1

- There is a beer Petr can drink in one minute TRUE
- Petr can drink any of the beers in two minutes FALSE
- Petr can drink *any of the* beers in three minutes TRUE
- Petr can drink *all the* beers in three minutes FALSE

$(\forall x)\varphi \rightarrow \varphi(a) \wedge \varphi(b)$ but not $(\forall x)\varphi \rightarrow \varphi(a) \& \varphi(b)$

$\varphi \wedge \psi \rightarrow \chi$ is equivalent to $(\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \vee (\psi \rightarrow \chi)$

On transitivity

We define a 'fuzzy indistinguishability' relation

$$Exy = \max\{0, 1 - |x - y|\}$$

Then in Łukasiewicz logics holds:

$$\|Exy \& Eyz \rightarrow Exz\| = 1$$

Re define other fuzzy relation (assume that $0 \leq a \leq 1$):

$$E_a xy = \min(1, \max(0, 1 + a - |x - y|))$$

Note that if $|x - y| \leq a$ then $E_a xy = 1$

Then in Łukasiewicz logics holds:

$$\|(\forall xyz)(Exy \& Eyz \rightarrow Exz)\| = 1 - a$$

On generalized quantifiers

Note: (generalized) quantifiers are functions from sets of individuals to $\{0, 1\}$

Thus: generalized quantifiers are special **unary predicates**

Thus our proposal is obvious:

fuzzy generalized quantifiers are functions from sets of individuals to $[0, 1]$

Note: if most participant are vegetarians, most of the food at the banquet is vegetarian

Probability inside Łukasiewicz logic: language

The language of $\mathbf{FP}(\mathbb{L})$ has a non-empty set V of the crisp (two-valued) propositional variables. It has three kinds of formulas:

- **NON-MODAL:** The formulas built from the propositional variables in the usual way, using crisp connectives \wedge and \neg i.e., a classical formulas
- **ATOMIC MODAL:** The formulas built from the non-modal formulas by using new fuzzy modality P i.e., formulas $P\varphi$, where φ is the non-modal formula,
- **EXTENDED MODAL:** The formulas built from the atomic modal formulas in the usual way, using connectives of the Łukasiewicz logic: $\neg_{\mathbb{L}}, \rightarrow_{\mathbb{L}}$.

Probability inside Łukasiewicz logic: semantics

The models of $\mathbf{FP}(\mathbf{Ł})$ are probability Kripke structure $\mathbf{K} = \langle W, e, \mu \rangle$ where:

- W is a non empty set of possible worlds,
- $e: W \times \text{VAR} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a crisp evaluation of the propositional variables in each world
- $\mu: 2^W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a finitely additive probability measure st. for each variable p , the set $\{w \mid e(w, p) = 1\}$ is measurable.

Probability inside Łukasiewicz logic: definition of truth

Let $\mathbf{K} = \langle W, e, \mu \rangle$ be a probability Kripke structure. The evaluation e can be extended to the formulas of the $\mathbf{FP}(\mathbf{Ł})$:

- **NON-MODAL:** an usual extension of the evaluation of the propositional variables to the non-modal formulas.
- **ATOMIC MODAL:** $e(\hat{w}, P\varphi) = \mu\{w \mid e(w, \varphi) = 1\}$
- **EXTENDED MODAL:** also an usual extension of the evaluation of the atomic modal formulas to the modal formulas

Probability inside Łukasiewicz logic: axiomatic system

(FP0) the axioms of the Łukasiewicz logic

(BOOL) $\varphi \vee \neg\varphi$ for non-modal φ

(FP1) $P(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow_{\mathbb{L}} (P\varphi \rightarrow_{\mathbb{L}} P\psi)$

(FP2) $\neg_{\mathbb{L}} P(\varphi) \rightarrow_{\mathbb{L}} P(\neg\varphi)$

(FP3) $P(\varphi \vee \psi) \rightarrow_{\mathbb{L}} ((P\psi \oplus (P\varphi \ominus P(\varphi \wedge \psi))))$

The deduction rules are modus ponens and the necessitation of P :
from φ infer $P\varphi$ (for φ being a non-modal formula)

Probability inside Łukasiewicz logic: completeness

Completeness: Let ψ be a modal formula and \mathbf{T} a finite modal theory over $\mathbf{FP}(\mathbf{L})$. Then $\mathbf{T} \vdash \psi$ iff $e_{\mathbf{K}}(\psi) = 1$ for each probability model \mathbf{K} of the theory \mathbf{T} .

Particular cases and modifications:

Quantifier 'many' (in KF with n worlds)

$$e(\hat{w}, M\varphi) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{w \in W} e(w, \varphi)$$

Modification of definition of semantics

- $e: W \times \text{VAR} \rightarrow [0, 1]$
- $\mu_w: [0, 1]^W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is any function

Thank you for you attention

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(and sorry for the examples)