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**PROTOTYPES AND IMPLICATURES**

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Does an utterance of (1) give rise to the embedded implicature (2)?

- (1) All of the squares are connected to some of the circles.
- (2) All of the squares are connected to some, but not all of the circles.

If so, this would be a serious blow to a Gricean explanation of implicatures, since it fails to predict such implicatures. Recent experiments have tried to show that the embedded implicature indeed arises. Participants were presented with a picture verifying and a picture falsifying the implicature and were asked which is a better representation of (1). Most participants opted for the picture verifying the implicature.

Does a preference for a representation actually amount to a full-fledged implicature? I argue for an alternative explanation in terms of prototypicality. Participants chose the more prototypical representation, but this doesn't (necessarily) mean that participants would infer (2) from an utterance of (1), or that (2) is a separate reading of (1).

I provide experimental evidence that (3) is similarly judged a better representation of a robin than, for instance, of an ostrich.

- (3) This is a bird.
- (4) This is a robin.

But here, it is clear that (3) doesn't license the implicature (4). So a preference for a representation isn't a reliable indication for the presence of an implicature. I conclude with a discussion on the relation and distinction between typicality effects and implicatures.